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The epistemization of person  
markers in reported speech 
Abstract 
Egophoricity is a cross-linguistically rare grammatical phenomenon. While numerous descrip-
tive studies have substantially improved our synchronic understanding of the category in re-
cent years, we are still largely ignorant of the diachronic origins of egophoricity systems. In 
this article, we address this gap and discuss a diachronic process that transforms person 
agreement markers into egophoricity markers. Based on evidence from three Tibeto-Burman 
languages, we reconstruct the diachronic transformation and argue that the process starts 
out in reported speech clauses once the direct construal of the predicate is generalized. This 
generalization allows for the functional reanalysis of first and third person markers as ego-
phoric and allophoric markers, while second person markers become functionally obsolete. 
Once person markers have undergone an epistemization in reported speech clauses, the 
innovative epistemic system is extended to simple declarative and interrogative clauses, 
where it gradually replaces the conservative person agreement system. 
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1 Introduction1 
Various Tibeto-Burman languages of the Himalayas display an epistemic2 grammatical cate-
gory that is commonly known as “egophoricity” or “conjunct/disjunct”. We here define ego-
phoricity as a grammatical category that marks access to knowledge as either privileged or-
non-privileged (see § 2.2 below for a more elaborate definition). In the course of the past few 
decades, a wealth of descriptive studies has considerably enhanced our synchronic under-
standing of this phenomenon. The diachronic origins of egophoricity systems have not re-
ceived much attention, however. Widmer (2015) addressed this gap and adduces evidence 
for a functional transformation of syntactic agreement into epistemic marking. In the course 
of this process, the verbal category “person” is transformed into the verbal category “ego-
phoricity” according to the scheme given in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Proposed reanalysis of person markers 
person  egophoricity 
first person ð egophoric 
second person ð - 
third person ð allophoric 
 
While Widmer (2015) provides substantial evidence for the aforementioned process, he 
does not go into the question of what causes the functional transformation of agreement 
markers into epistemic markers. In this article, we address this remaining gap and argue that 
the epistemization of person markers is the direct consequence of an innovation in the do-
main of reported speech. The innovation in question not only allows for the reanalysis of per-
                                                
1 We would like to thank Dominique Knuchel and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this article. All remaining mistakes are of course our own. 
2 We use the label “epistemic” as an umbrella term for grammatical categories that serve the primary 
function of relating the knowledge that is contained in a given proposition to the knowledge of the 
speaker or other speech act participants. Accordingly, the term does not only comprise egophoricity 
marking but also other categories such as evidentiality (see Aikhenvald 2004) and mirativity (see 
DeLancey 2012). However, as this article is exclusively concerned with egophoricity marking, the 
terms “egophoricity marking” and “epistemic marking” will be used interchangeably in the following. 
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son markers as epistemic markers, but also gives rise to a deictically mixed reported speech 
construction that is widely attested in Tibeto-Burman languages of the Himalayas. We base 
our hypothesis on data from three distantly related Tibeto-Burman languages that bear wit-
ness to different stages of the process.  
The structure of this article is as follows: In § 2, we clarify some theoretical issues and 
provide a brief definition of egophoricity marking. In § 3, we describe the egophoricity system 
of Bunan and demonstrate that the egophoricity opposition evolved from a former person 
agreement system. In § 4, we put the Bunan evidence into perspective by comparing it with 
the Tibeto-Burman languages Dolakha Newar and Sunwar. In doing so, we show that the 
three languages bear witness to the functional transformation of person markers to ego-
phoricity markers and demonstrate that the reanalysis is linked to an innovation in the do-
main of reported speech. In § 5, we argue that the functional transformation of person 
agreement into epistemic marking becomes possible if the direct construal of the predicate in 
reported speech clauses is generalized. In § 6, we address a number of problems and open 
questions before summarizing the major findings of the study in § 7.  
2 Preliminaries 
2.1 Terminology 
The phenomenon that we refer to as “egophoricity” in this article was first described under 
the name “conjunct/disjunct” by Hale & Watters (1973) and Hale (1980) for some Tibeto-
Burman languages of Nepal. A number of scholars subsequently adopted this term (e.g. 
DeLancey 1990; Curnow 1997; Hargreaves 2005; Watters 2006; inter alia), while others re-
frained from using it and developed their own terminology, e.g. “egophoric” vs. “heterophoric” 
(Tournadre 1991), “self-person” vs. “other-person” (Sun 1993), “volitionality” (Haller 2000), 
“old knowledge” vs. “new knowledge” (Huber 2005), “assertor’s involvement marking” (Creis-
sels 2008).  
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In the course of the past ten years, the term “egophoricity”, which is derived from Tour-
nadre’s (1991) “egophoric”, has gained ever growing acceptance and is now the most widely 
used term. Interestingly, the term “heterophoric”, which was introduced together with the term 
“egophoric”, never gained wide currency. This is most probably due to the fact that Tourna-
dre himself stopped using the term early on when he abandoned his dichotomic analysis of 
the Lhasa Tibetan epistemic system and began to oppose the egophoric category to eviden-
tial categories such as “sensory”, “inferential”, and “factual” (cf. Tournadre 2008: 301, fn. 48). 
However, while such an approach is feasible for Tibetic languages, it cannot be easily im-
plemented for languages that have binary egophoricity systems. As a consequence, Post 
(2013) introduced the term “alterphoric” to refer to the functional counterpart of egophoric 
markers in Galo, a Tibeto-Burman language of Northeast India that also displays a binary 
egophoricity system. In this paper, we essentially adopt Post’s approach, but would like to 
propose the term “allophoric” as an alternative to the term “alterphoric”. The term “allophoric” 
has the advantage of being a genuine Greek coinage (Greek αλλος ‘other’ + Greek φέρω 
‘carry’) as opposed to the etymologically hybrid form “alterphoric” (Latin alter ‘other’ + φέρω 
‘carry’) and thus represents a compromise between Post’s term “alterphoric” and Tournadre’s 
term “heterophoric”.3  
2.2 Defining egophoricity 
In this article, we essentially take up an approach by Hargreaves (1991, 2005), who de-
fines egophoricity as a binary grammatical category that specifies one’s access to mental 
states as either privileged or non-privileged. Expanding Hargreaves’ original conception, we 
define egophoricity as a grammatical category that indicates whether one has privileged or 
non-privileged access to the knowledge on which a proposition is based. We understand the 
notion of privileged access as describing a privileged epistemic relationship that holds be-
tween a speech-act participant and the knowledge that is conveyed in a proposition. Ego-
                                                
3 Note that the conceptual pair “egophoric” vs. “allophoric” has already been used by Dahl (2000) in 
combination with the term “reference”. Dahl defines “egophoric reference” as reference to speech-act 
participants, generic reference, and logophoric reference, while defining “allophoric reference” as ref-
erence to non-generic 3rd person referents. 
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phoric markers thus express that one has a privileged epistemic perspective on an event and 
possesses epistemic authority to assert the relevant facts, whereas allophoric markers indi-
cate that this is not the case.  
Egophoricity markers may relate to different speech act participants depending on 
whether a proposition is declarative or interrogative and whether it is a primary or a reported 
utterance. Several scholars have come up with epistemic roles to account for these shifts in 
perspective, e.g. “epistemic source” (Hargreaves 1991, 2005), “locutor” (Curnow 1997; Ai-
khenvald 2004), “informant” (Bickel & Nichols 2007), or “assertor” (Creissels 2008). We 
adopt the term “assertor” for the following discussion. We define the assertor as the speech-
act participant from whose perspective a situation is portrayed and to whose viewpoint epis-
temic markers relate.  
 It has long been noted that egophoricity systems bear witness to a number of shifts in 
perspective. In simple declarative contexts, egophoricity markers prototypically reflect the 
viewpoint of the primary speaker, while in simple interrogative contexts, they most often re-
late to the perspective of the primary addressee.4 In reported declarative contexts, ego-
phoricity markers are commonly calculated from the perspective of the reported speaker and 
in reported interrogative contexts, they generally relate to the epistemic stance of the report-
ed addressee. The following table summarizes these canonical shifts. 
Table 2: Typical perspective shifts in egophoricity systems 
 primary speech act reported speech act 
declarative speech act primary speaker reported speaker 
interrogative speech act primary addressee reported addressee 
 
                                                
4 Following Evans (2012: 69), we refer to the speech act participants in the current speech event as 
the “primary speaker” and the “primary addressee”, and to the speech act participants in the reported 
speech event as the “reported speaker” and the “reported addressee”. 
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While it is true that the abovementioned perspective shifts are characteristic of ego-
phoricity system in general, one has to be aware of the fact that they are not based on strict 
rules. In other words, the assertor cannot simply be defined based on whether an utterance 
is declarative / interrogative or primary / reported. Evidence that the parameters of illocution-
ary force, reported speech, and the assertor role are ultimately independent of each other 
comes from pragmatically marked speech acts such as rhetorical questions. Rhetorical ques-
tions differ from true questions in the sense that they do not represent requests for infor-
mation but rather assertions of facts (Heritage 2012). As a consequence, egophoric markers 
often relate to the perspective of the speaker rather than the viewpoint of addressee in such 
contexts (cf. Widmer forthcoming). However, we do not want to go further into the intricacies 
of perspectival shifts here, as this would go beyond the scope of this article. In the following, 
we thus confine ourselves to a discussion of the perspective shifts outlined in Table 4. 
Egophoricity marking is a multifaceted grammatical category with a considerable de-
gree of cross-linguistic variation. This is due to the fact that there is no universal definition of 
privileged access. Rather, every language that displays egophoricity marking draws the 
boundary between the domain of egophoric marking and the domain of allophoric marking in 
a different manner. As Bickel (2008) has pointed out, languages show a particularly great 
deal of variation with regard to the “scope” that egophoric markers can have.5 According to 
Bickel, cross-linguistic evidence suggests that it is helpful to distinguish two types of scope 
constructions: (i) constructions in which egophoric markers have scope over participant roles 
(“epistemic argument marking”) and (ii) constructions in which egophoric markers have 
scope over propositions (“epistemic proposition marking”). In constructions of type (i), ego-
phoric marking expresses that the assertor has privileged access to knowledge by assuming 
a certain participant role in a given event. In constructions of type (ii), an egophoric marker 
                                                
5 Note that Bickel (2008) uses the term “scope” in a different sense than it usually has in the literature. 
In formal semantics and other areas of theoretical linguistics, the concept of scope is commonly used 
to denote the modification relationship that a semantic operator bears to specific constituents within an 
utterance (Cann 1993: 8–9). Bickel (2008) uses the term “scope” to describe the range of different 
grammatical contexts in which an egophoric marker can be used. 
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expresses that the assertor has privileged access to knowledge because she / he considers 
the relevant knowledge as a part of her / his “territory of information” (Kamio 1997), that is to 
say, her / his sphere of intimate and personal knowledge.   
In the following, we briefly illustrate differences in the scope of egophoric marking with 
data from Akhvakh (Nakh-Daghestanian) and Shigatse Tibetan (Tibeto-Burman). Akhvakh 
possesses a perfective egophoric ending -ada, which has scope over the participant role of 
an agent (cf. Creissels 2008). In other words, the marker -ada can only be used in contexts 
in which the assertor maps onto the participant role of an agent. 
(1) de-de kaʁa q̄war-ada 
1SG-ERG paper write-PFV.EGO 
 ‘I wrote a letter.’  
(Creissels 2008: 1) 
Shigatse Tibetan possesses an imperfective form -kī=jœ (Haller & Haller 2007). Like 
the Akhvakh egophoric perfective ending -ada, -kī=jœ can have scope over agent argu-
ments, as in (2) below. 
(2) ŋa̠ ji̠kē ʈʂʰi̖-kī=jœ 
1SG letter write.IPFV-NMLZ=IPFV.EGO 
‘I am writing a letter.’   
(Haller & Haller 2007: 88) 
In addition, the Shigatse imperfective form -kī=jœ also has scope over propositions if 
the speaker considers the relevant knowledge to be part of her / his sphere of personal and 
intimate knowledge. This is for example the case in (3), where the speaker describes her / 
his child’s allergic reaction to oranges. 
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(3) ōlœ̀ tsʰālūma sie̖-nā, su̠kpō-la pu̠rū  
child.ERG orange eat.PFV-COND body-DAT rash  
thœ̠̃-kī=jœ  
come.out-NMLZ=IPFV.EGO 
‘If (my) child eats oranges, it breaks out in rash.’   
(Haller & Haller 2007: 131) 
Since the Shigatse form -kī=jœ can have scope over propositions, the form can be 
used in a much wider range of contexts than the Akhvakh form -ada, which is exclusively tied 
to the participant role “agent”. We return to the issue of scope in § 3.2, where we use the 
concept to describe the synchronic behavior of egophoric markers, and in § 6.1, where we 
use the concept to model the diachronic evolution of egophoric markers. 
2.3 Reported speech and deixis 
Quoting other people is a common strategy in human communication. Whenever we have to 
rely on the testimony of other people in giving an account of an event, we are likely to re-
count the relevant event in the form of reported speech. Languages often possess more than 
just one grammatical strategy to express reported speech. In Western linguistics, there is a 
longstanding tradition of distinguishing between two prototypes of reported speech construc-
tions: (1) direct speech, which reproduces the reported speaker’s words and renders the re-
ported utterance from the deictic viewpoint of the reported speaker, and (2) indirect speech, 
which renders the reported utterance from the deictic viewpoint of the primary speaker 
(Coulmas 1986: 2). Two canonical examples are given in the following. 
(4) Direct speech (English) 
She said ‘I eat meat.’  
(5) Indirect speech (English)   
She said (that) she eats meat.   
In a recent article, Evans (2012) reassesses the utility of the concepts of direct and 
indirect speech for descriptive and typological linguistics and suggests that they should not 
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be seen as universal concepts that are present in every language but merely as canonical 
prototypes from which languages may deviate in various ways.6 Most importantly, Evans 
points out that it is futile to apply the labels “direct” and “indirect” at the level of entire report-
ed speech constructions, as the individual constituents of reported constructions may be cal-
culated from different perspectives, thus giving rise to reported speech constructions with 
mixed deixis. As a consequence, it is much more sensible to apply these labels at the level of 
individual deictically sensitive expressions that occur in a reported speech clause. 
From a Eurocentric perspective, deictically mixed reported speech constructions may 
seem peculiar. The grammar of English, for example, does not allow for the mingling of dif-
ferent perspectives in a reported speech clause, as the following (ungrammatical) examples 
illustrate. In (6), the subject pronoun she is calculated from the perspective of the primary 
speaker, while the predicate eat renders the perspective of the reported speaker. In (7), the 
subject pronoun I represents the perspective of the reported speaker, whereas the predicate 
eats relates to the perspective of the primary speaker. 
(6) Deictically mixed speech: type I (English – ungrammatical)    
*She said (that) she eat meat.  
(7) Deictically mixed speech: type II (English – ungrammatical)  
*She said (that) I eats meat.  
However, deictically mixed reported speech constructions – in particular type I exem-
plified in (6) – are common in some Tibeto-Burman languages of the Himalayas, as we 
demonstrate in this paper. We now leave the issue of reported speech and turn to the de-
scription of a number of languages that are crucial for our argumentation. We get back to 
reported speech in § 5, where we demonstrate how such constructions may cause the rea-
nalysis of person agreement markers as epistemic markers. 
                                                
6 Evans (2012) also identifies a third canonical type which he refers to as biperspectival speech. In 
canonical biperspectival speech, every deictically sensitive expression encodes both the original and 
the current speaker's perspectives. This type of reported speech will not be discussed in this article, as 
it is not important for our argumentation.  
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3 Person marking and epistemic marking in Bunan 
3.1 An overview of the Bunan verbal system 
Bunan is a Tibeto-Burman language that is spoken in North India (Himachal Pradesh) by 
between 3,500 and 4,000 speakers and is commonly assigned to the West Himalayish sub-
group (Widmer forthcoming). The following table gives an overview of the structure of a Bu-
nan verb. Note that prefixes and non-productive derivational suffixes are not shown in the 
table.  
Table 3: The structure of a Bunan verb 
Root Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 4 
 Derivation Transitivity  Inflection Inflection 
 • detransitive 
 
 
• intransitive 
• middle 
• transitive 
• egophoricity 
(secondary) 
• tense 
• mood 
• evidentiality 
• egophoricity 
(primary) 
• number 
• person 
 
Bunan possesses a moderately complex epistemic verbal system. In the present tense, 
verbal morphology encodes a straightforward egophoricity opposition and indicates whether 
or not the assertor possesses privileged access to the knowledge that is conveyed in a prop-
osition. In addition, the present tense endings mark the number of the subject as either “sin-
gular” or “plural”. Consider the following paradigm.  
Table 4: Egophoric and allophoric marking in Bunan (verb lik- ʻto makeʼ) 
 SG PL 
EGO lik-tɕ-ek lik-tɕ-ʰek 
ALLO lik-tɕ-are lik-tɕ-ʰak 
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The situation is more complex in the past tense domain, as the past tense endings 
simultaneously encode the grammatical categories “egophoricity” and “evidentiality” in an 
instance of cumulative exponence. Accordingly, past tense endings not only specify whether 
or not the assertor possesses privileged access to the knowledge conveyed in a proposition, 
but also indicate whether the assertor has gained the relevant knowledge through direct per-
ception or by means of an inference. As epistemic marking is considerably more complex in 
the past tense domain and also evolved in a different way, we confine ourselves to discuss-
ing egophoricity marking in the present tense domain. A synchronic description of epistemic 
marking in the past tense domain can be found in Widmer (forthcoming).  
Finally, note that the epistemic distinctions are also found in the copula system. The 
equative copula jen- is inflected for egophoricity, while the attributive copula de- possesses 
the inherent values “direct evidence” and “allophoric access”. The existential copula ni- and 
the possessive copula ta- are inflected for person and number, but also display characteris-
tics of an emerging egophoricity distinction (see Widmer forthcoming for discussion).  
3.2 The egophoricity system in the present tense 
In the Bunan present tense domain, privileged access is defined as the assertor’s di-
rect access to knowledge that she / he gained by assuming a certain participant role in a 
given event. In the following, we distinguish four types of participant roles to describe the 
present tense egophoricity system: (i) agent, (ii) endoceptive experiencer, (iii) exoceptive 
experiencer, and (iv) theme.7 The agent is defined as the most agent-like argument of a pro-
totypically controllable event (e.g. running, eating, giving). The endoceptive experiencer is 
the experiencer argument of an event that involves the perception of an internal stimulus or 
mental state (e.g. being hungry, being afraid, thinking), while the exoceptive experiencer is 
the experiencer argument of an event that involves the perception of an external stimulus 
                                                
7 The terms “endoceptive“ and “exoceptive” have been adopted from Daudey (2014). Daudey uses an 
approach similar to ours to describe the egophoricity system of the Tibeto-Burman language Wadu 
Pumi. However, she does not analyze the egophoricity system in terms of participant roles, but rather 
resorts to a number of different verb types, viz. “controllable verbs”, “non-controllable verbs”, “endo-
ceptive verbs”, and “exoceptive verbs”.  
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(e.g. seeing, hearing, smelling). The theme, finally, is the most agent-like argument of a pro-
totypically non-controllable event, e.g. non-controllable motion (e.g. falling, stumbling, slip-
ping) or events that involve non-controllable physical or mental processes (e.g. dying, forget-
ting, losing). 
In Bunan, egophoric present tense endings have scope over agents and endoceptive 
experiencers. In other words, egophoric endings occur in contexts in which the assertor as-
sumes the role of an agent or an endoceptive experiencer, while allophoric endings occur in 
all other contexts. This is illustrated by the following examples. 
(8) Assertor = agent  
gi len lik-tɕ-ek 
1SG work do-TR-PRS.EGO.SG 
 ‘I am working.’ 
 (TD Dict) 
  
(9) Assertor = endoceptive experiencer  
gi tsher-k-ek 
1SG be.sad-INTR-PRS.EGO.SG 
 ‘I am sad.’  
(TD Dict) 
  
(10) Assertor = exoceptive experiencer  
gi=tok karma tant-k-are 
1SG=DAT star see-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 
‘I can see the stars.’  
(TD 230.9 [elicited]) 
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(11) Assertor = theme 
gi dat-k-are  
1SG fall-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 
 ‘I am falling!’  
(TG 13.36 [elicited]) 
It is important to note that predicates that denote controllable or endoceptive events 
may at times receive allophoric marking despite the fact that their subject is identical with the 
assertor. An example of such a clause is given below. 
(12) gi ek bar ra-k-are  
1SG one time come-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 
 ‘I appear once (in this video).’   
(SC unrec 1) 
However, the first person singular pronoun gi and the allophoric present tense ending 
-are co-occur in consequence of a highly particular pragmatic situation. The speaker who 
uttered the sentence given in (12) referred to his appearance in a video. In this context, the 
speaker assumed an outside perspective with regard to his own acting, as he did no longer 
possess a direct cognitive access to his actions in the video. Accordingly, he used the allo-
phoric ending -are, despite the fact that the syntactic structure of the clause would potentially 
license the occurrence of an egophoric marker. This example illustrates that egophoricity 
marking is essentially an epistemic rather than a syntactic category. The distribution of ego-
phoric and allophoric forms can be largely predicted based on the semantics of the verb and 
the person value of the “subject pronoun”, but eventually it is the pragmatic context that de-
termines whether the use of an egophoric form is appropriate or not.  
It is important to note that the egophoric marker -ek cannot have scope over proposi-
tions. In other words, the ending cannot be used to express that the knowledge that is con-
veyed in a proposition belongs to the assertor’s sphere of personal and intimate knowledge. 
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This is illustrated by (13) below. In this sentence, the assertor reports that her / his child is 
severely sick. Knowledge about one’s own family is prototypically personal and exclusive 
(Kamio 1997). It is thus not surprising that there are languages in which propositions about 
family affairs commonly fall into the scope of egophoric markers, e.g. Shigatse Tibetan (cf. 
(3) above). In Bunan, however, only allophoric marking is possible in such contexts.  
(13) than=ɕek gi=ki bete hoɕmej dzuk   
today=about 1SG=GEN child much pain   
lik-tɕ-are / *-ek  
do-TR-PRS.ALLO.SG / *-PRS.EGO.SG 
 ‘These days, my child is very sick.’ 
 (TD 102.8 [elicited]) 
Since egophoric present tense markers exclusively have scope over agents and en-
doceptive experiencers, verbs denoting prototypically controllable events and endoceptive 
events always receive allophoric endings if their most agent-like argument is not identical 
with the assertor. Accordingly, declarative statements about second and third persons can 
only receive allophoric marking, as the following examples illustrate. 
(14) ini dzaŋdzaŋ lik-tɕ-are 
2[SG].HON insincere.refusal do-TR-PRS.EGO.SG 
 “You are refusing the tea insincerely!’  
(Conversation 36.12) 
 
(15) dordʑe=dzi dzaŋpo=tok dzamen lik-tɕ-are 
Dorje=ERG.SG Zangpo=DAT food do-TR-PRS.ALLO.SG 
 “Dorje is cooking food for Zangpo.’  
(NN 39.4 [elicited]) 
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In interrogative contexts, egophoric endings display a different distribution, as the as-
sertor role is assumed by the addressee rather than the speaker in such contexts. According-
ly, egophoric endings can only occur in contexts in which the addressee is asked about in-
formation to which he is assumed to have direct access. If the question refers to the speaker 
or a non-speech-act participant, only allophoric marking is possible. Consider the following 
examples. 
(16) gi noj dza-k-are=la 
1SG much eat-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG=Q 
‘Do I eat a lot?’   
(TC unrec 1) 
 
(17) han=dzi kʰa lik-tɕ-ek 
2=ERG.SG what do-TR-PRS.EGO.SG 
‘What are you doing?’  
(Conversation 87.352) 
 
(18) awa kʰa lik-tɕ-are 
father what do-TR-PRS.ALLO.SG 
‘What is father doing?’  
(Conversation 53.3) 
The distribution of egophoric forms in reported statements can be explained as a 
consequence of the fact that egophoric markers reflect the perspective of the reported 
speaker rather than the primary speaker. This is illustrated by the following examples.8  
                                                
8 Examples (19) through (22) display a syntactic structure that is artificial to some extent, as those 
sentences were elicited rather than recorded from natural discourse. In reported speech constructions 
that occur in natural discourse, pronouns are commonly dropped unless they are focal constituents. In 
addition, speech verbs usually follow the speech act complement. A more natural version of example 
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(19) tal=dzi riŋ-k-are tal gjokspa kjuma  
3=ERG.SG say-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 3[SG] quick home 
ra-k-ek 
come-INTR-PRS.EGO.SG 
‘Shei said9 that shei will come home soon.’  
(TD 62.2 [elicited]) 
 
(20) tal=dzi riŋ-k-are tal gjokspa kjuma  
3=ERG.SG say-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 3[SG] quick home 
ra-k-are 
come-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 
‘Shei said that shej will come home soon.’  
(TD 62.3 [elicited]) 
  
(21) tal=dzi riŋ-k-are gi gjokspa kjuma  
3=ERG.SG say-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 1SG quick home 
ra-k-are 
come-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 
‘She said that I will come home soon.’  
(TD 62.1 [elicited]) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
(19) would thus be gjokspa kjuma ra-k-ek riŋ-k-are ‘quick home come-INTR-PRS.EGO.SG say-INTR-
PRS.ALLO.SG’ ‘(She) said (that she) will come home soon’.  
9 In Bunan, verbs that introduce reported speech are not inflected for past tense if they refer to a 
speech act in the past, presumably because reported speech acts from the past are conceptualized as 
possessing present validity, as they still reflect the opinion of the reported speaker. 
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(22) tal=dzi riŋ-k-are tal bup-dza  
3=ERG.SG say-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 3[SG] stumble-PST.DIR.ALLO.SG 
‘Shei said that shei/j stumbled.’  
(TD 107.14 [elicited]) 
In the example sentences given above, the predicate of the main clause always re-
ceives allophoric marking, as the primary speaker does not possess privileged access to the 
utterance made by the reported speaker. In the complement clause, egophoric marking is 
only possible if the subject of the complement clause is identical with the reported speaker 
and if the predicate denotes a controllable or endoceptive event. If this is not the case, the 
predicate of the complement clause receives allophoric marking. 
The distribution of egophoric and allophoric forms in reported interrogative speech 
acts can be accounted for on the basis of the assertor. Egophoric forms occur if the reported 
addressee is asked about information to which he is assumed to have privileged access, 
whereas allophoric forms occur if he is asked a question about information to which he is not 
assumed to have privileged access. Consider the following examples. 
(23) sonam=dzi rintɕen=tok ʂu-tɕ-are tal ika 
Sonam=ERG.SG Rinchen=DAT ask-TR-PRS.ALLO.SG 3[SG] when 
ra-k-ek 
come-INTR-PRS.EGO.SG 
‘Sonam asked Rincheni when hei would come.’  
(TD 327.2 [elicited]) 
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(24) sonam=dzi rintɕen=tok ʂu-tɕ-are tal ika 
Sonam=ERG.SG Rinchen=DAT ask-TR-PRS.ALLO.SG 3[SG] when 
ra-k-are 
come-INTR-PRS.ALLO.SG 
‘Sonam asked Rincheni when shej / hej would come.’  
(TD 327.4 [elicited]) 
3.3 The second person forms 
The example sentences that we have considered so far seem to suggest that Bunan 
encodes a straightforward egophoricity opposition in the present tense. However, the situa-
tion is in fact more complicated, as Bunan possesses two additional present tense endings -
ana and -ʰakni, which do not fit into the egophoricity paradigm. These endings are interesting 
from a sociolinguistic perspective, as their occurrence is subject to pronounced age-
dependent variation. The two morphemes are only found in the genealect10 of old speakers 
that are above the age of sixty. Members of the younger speaker generation do not actively 
use these forms and some younger speakers are not at all familiar with these morphemes. In 
Widmer’s (forthcoming) corpus of natural speech, the endings -ana and -ʰakni are exclusively 
attested in combination with second person singular and plural pronouns, respectively. They 
occur with second person pronouns regardless of whether the relevant predicate denotes a 
controllable, endoceptive, exoceptive, or non-controllable event, which suggests that they 
have to be analyzed as second person subject agreement markers. The use of these end-
ings is illustrated by the following examples. 
(25) kʰa lik-tɕ-ana  
what make-TR-PRS.2SG 
‘What are you doing?’ 
(Conversation 49.2)   
                                                
10 We use the term “genealect” (from Greek γενεά ‘generation’ + Greek λέγω ‘speak’) to refer to the 
variety of a language as it is spoken by a certain speaker generation. 
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(26) han=tsʰi nira kʰa lik-tɕ-ʰakni han=ɕi guj 
2=ERG.PL daytime what make-TR-PRS.2PL 2=PL where 
dʑot-k-ʰakni 
sit-INTR-PRS.2PL 
‘What are you guys doing all day? Where are you staying?’ 
(Conversation 69.6) 
The endings -ana and -ʰakni are exclusively attested in interrogative sentences or de-
clarative statements that refer to an impending danger. It is not possible to use the mor-
phemes in pragmatically unmarked declarative statements. 
(27) han bret-k-ana ne 
2[SG] slip-INTR-PRS.2SG SUG 
‘You will slip (and fall from the roof)ǃ’ 
(TD 329.2 [elicited]) 
 
(28) ini dzaŋdzaŋ lik-tɕ-are / *lik-tɕ-ana  
2[SG].HON insincere.refusal do-TR-PRS.ALLO.SG / *do-TR-PRS.2SG 
‘You are refusing the tea insincerelyǃ’  
(TD 325.7 [elicited]) 
It is important to note that there appears to be no semantic difference between ques-
tions that are based on the agreement markers -ana / -ʰakni and questions that are based on 
the epistemic markers -ek / -ʰek and -are / -ʰak. According to the intuition of old speakers, the 
questions in (17) and (25) have exactly the same meaning. The two propositions primarily 
differ in terms of their sociolinguistic markedness. The agreement markers -ana / -ʰakni are 
sociolinguistically marked, as they represent a characteristic feature of the genealect of old 
speakers and are not attested in the speech of young speakers. The epistemic markers -ek / 
-ʰek and -are / -ʰak are sociolinguistically unmarked, as they are attested in both the gene-
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alect of the oldest speaker generation and the genealects of the younger speaker genera-
tions. The limited distribution of the second person agreement markers strongly suggests 
that these endings are an archaic grammatical feature that has only been retained in the ge-
nealect of the oldest speaking generation. As we demonstrate in the following, this assump-
tion can be corroborated with evidence from historical sources. 
3.4 Diachronic considerations 
In the case of Bunan, we are in the fortunate position of possessing data from the 
early 20th century, which allow us to study changes that occurred in the verbal systems over 
the course of the past one hundred years. The data in question were collected by the Ger-
man missionary August Hermann Francke. Based on Francke’s material, it is possible to 
compare the present tense system of contemporary Bunan with the present tense paradigm 
that was recorded one hundred years ago. The present tense paradigm reported by Francke 
(1909) is given in the table below.11 
Table 5: Francke’s (1909) present tense paradigm 
 SG PL 
1 ligceg ligcheg 
2 ligcana ligchagni 
3 ligcare ligchak 
 
Remarkably, Francke’s present tense forms give the appearance of a paradigm that 
is based on the categories “person” and “number”. It is not difficult to relate these forms to 
the verbal endings given in Table 4. Francke’s first person forms clearly correspond to ego-
phoric forms in contemporary Bunan, whereas Francke’s third person forms correspond to 
allophoric forms. Francke’s second person forms, finally, are equivalent to the second person 
forms in contemporary Bunan.  
                                                
11 Francke used superscript <g> to transcribe unreleased plosives in syllable final position.  
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When having a first look at these correspondences, one immediately gets the impres-
sion that Francke may have been confronted with the egophoricity system that is attested in 
contemporary Bunan, but wrongly imposed an agreement system onto the language. Such 
an interpretation seems especially plausible in consideration of the fact that epistemic verbal 
categories were virtually unknown in the early 20th century and, accordingly, often ignored or 
misinterpreted by Western scholars (cf. Aikhenvald 2004: 12). However, on closer examina-
tion, it becomes clear that it is not justified to reject Francke’s analysis beforehand. As a mat-
ter of fact, there are various pieces of evidence that suggest that his analysis was accurate 
and that Bunan exhibited a full-fledged verb agreement system one hundred years ago. As 
these pieces of evidence have already been discussed in Widmer (2015), they are not reca-
pitulated in full here. Rather, we confine ourselves to mentioning the most relevant points. 
First, Francke (1909) provided a wealth of paradigms for Bunan, all of which are fully 
inflected for person and number. Moreover, Francke (1998: 135) explicitly noted that the 
“[t]he three languages of Lahoul [i.e. Bunan, Manchad, and Tinan] have very full systems of 
conjugation, with terminations for the different persons, singular and plural, whilst the Tibetan 
verb hardly ever distinguishes between persons.” The fact that Francke recognized that the 
verbal systems of western Tibetan varieties (see Koshal 1979; Hein 2001, 2007; Preiswerk 
2011) were different from the verb systems of the West Himalayish languages spoken in 
Lahaul strongly suggests that Bunan did not exhibit a full-fledged egophoricity system in 
those days. If Bunan had displayed a firmly established egophoricity system, it would seem 
strange that Francke acknowledged the different nature of Tibetan verbal systems while im-
posing a verb agreement system on Bunan.  
Second, there is language-internal evidence indicating that Bunan possessed a full-
fledged verb agreement system in the past. For one thing, the verb in contemporary Bunan is 
inflected for a binary number opposition (“singular” vs. “plural”, see above). This number dis-
tinction was already reported by Francke (1909, 1998). For another thing, there are still rem-
nants of first and second person agreement endings, and these correspond to the first and 
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second person agreement endings described by Francke (1909, 1998). Accordingly, syntac-
tic agreement in terms of both “person” and “number” is still attested in contemporary Bunan. 
The fact that person and number distinctions are more common in the speech of old speak-
ers suggests that they are the remnants of a more complex agreement system. 
Third, there is comparative evidence for the claim that Bunan once possessed a verb 
agreement system. All West Himalayish languages that have been described to the present 
day have been reported as possessing verb agreement systems, and some of the person 
agreement markers found in those languages are clearly cognate with the epistemic markers 
found in Bunan. The following tables give an overview of first and second person agreement 
markers in selected West Himalayish languages.12  
Table 6: First person endings in selected West Himalayish languages 
Language First singular  First plural  Source 
Manchad -g, -ga -ñi (Sharma 1996: 86–87) 
Tinan -g -ñi (Sharma 1996: 90–91) 
Kinnauri -k -ɕ (Takahashi 2001: 109) 
Shumcho -kʰ -kʰ, -ɕ  (Huber 2013: 229) 
Sunnami -kʰi, -k -kʰi, -k (Widmer, fieldnotes) 
Rongpo -ki, -ṅ -ni (Zoller 1983: 68) 
 
                                                
12 Third person endings are not considered here, as the third person category is often zero-marked in 
West Himalayish languages. To be sure, a number of West Himalayish languages display third person 
markers. However, the relevant morphemes cannot be reconstructed for Proto-West Himalayish, 
which suggests that they are language-specific innovations. 
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Table 7: Second person endings in selected West Himalayish languages 
Language Second singular  Second plural  Source 
Manchad -n, -na -ñi (Sharma 1996: 86–87) 
Tinan -n -ñi (Sharma 1996: 90–91) 
Kinnauri -n -č (Takahashi 2001: 109) 
Shumcho -n, -na -ɕ (Huber 2013: 229) 
Sunnami -na, -nu -na, -nu (Widmer, fieldnotes) 
Rongpo -n -ni (Zoller 1983: 68) 
 
As the two tables illustrate, the Bunan singular endings -ek ‘PRS.EGO.SG’ and -ana 
‘PRS.2SG’ have clear cognates in other West Himalayish languages. The Bunan plural mark-
ers -hek ‘PRS.EGO.PL’ and -hakni ‘PRS.2PL’ are more difficult to relate to plural endings in other 
West Himalayish languages. This is a consequence of the fact that several West Himalayish 
languages have generalized the second person plural form (Manchad, Tinan, Rongpo) or 
innovated new markers (Kinnauri, Shumcho). Nevertheless, both plural markers have clear 
cognates in other West Himalayish languages. The ending -hek ‘PRS.EGO.PL’ has a cognate 
in Shumcho -kh and Sunnami -khi / -k, while the second syllable of the ending -hakni ‘PRS.2PL’ 
has cognates in Manchad, Tinan, and Rongpo. Also note that the second person endings -
ana and -hakni have cognates outside of West Himalayish (see DeLancey 2014). 
This strongly suggests that Bunan indeed possessed a full-fledged agreement system 
in the past and that Francke’s (1909) account of the Bunan verbal system has to be taken 
seriously. At the same time, there is evidence that the egophoricity system of contemporary 
Bunan was already emergent in the beginning of the 20th century. This is suggested by the 
fact that there is some evidence for a “change in progress” in the Bunan sources from the 
early 20th century. For example, Konow noted in the Linguistic Survey of India (Grierson 
1909: 473) that Bunan commonly indexed the person and number features of the subject on 
the predicate, but also acknowledged that “[t]he personal suffixes are often dropped alto-
gether”. Konow’s statements suggests that certain person markers were gradually becoming 
obsolete in the early 20th century, which in turn indicates that some speakers had already 
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shifted to the innovative epistemic system that no longer incorporated those endings. Fur-
ther, Francke (1909) reported a full-fledged person agreement paradigm for the equative 
copula jen-. However, in a number of stories (Francke 1926, 2008) he also reported forms 
that are formally and functionally equivalent to the egophoric and allophoric forms of the 
equative copula in contemporary Bunan. Again, this indicates that syntactic agreement and 
epistemic marking coexisted in the times of Francke. 
In this context, it is also interesting to consider a statement made by one of my oldest 
consultants (*1939) when going through Francke’s materials. When confronted with 
Francke’s paradigms, he said that he was familiar with these forms and that this was the way 
old women used to talk when he was young. His statement suggests that in the mid-20th cen-
tury the archaic person agreement system was still commonly encountered in the speech of 
old female speakers. This implies that the functional transformation of verb agreement into 
epistemic marking may have started out in male speech and was only later adopted by wom-
en. This scenario would fit well with Jäschke’s (1865: 94) statement that Tibetan varieties ‒ 
the languages which most probably had a strong influence on the emerging epistemic verbal 
system ‒ were “understood and spoken fluently enough in intercourse with genuine Tibetans 
by the adult men, but more or less imperfectly by women and children” in the mid-19th centu-
ry. 
If Francke’s account of the Bunan verbal system was accurate, this leads us to the 
questions of how the functional reanalysis of person agreement markers as epistemic mark-
ers went about and what ultimately triggered it. An internal reconstruction of the Bunan 
agreement system helps identifying the kind of constructions in which the functional motiva-
tion may have arisen. Based on the diachronic correspondences established in Table 1, we 
may assume that the clauses given in (19) and (21) must originally have been based on what 
in retrospect appear to be “agreement mismatches”, as the first person pronoun gi occurred 
together with the verbal ending -are, which must originally have been a third person agree-
ment marker. Accordingly, we may infer that the construction that triggered the functional 
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transformation of person markers as egophoricity markers allowed the combination of subject 
pronouns with non-congruent person markers to express epistemic distinctions. The gram-
mar of contemporary Bunan does not allow us to identify this construction, as the former per-
son distinction has been reanalyzed as an egophoricity opposition for the major part. Howev-
er, there are other Tibeto-Burman languages that bear witness to early stages of the func-
tional transformation of person markers into egophoricity markers and, accordingly, may pro-
vide us with interesting insights into the functional motivation of the diachronic process. Two 
such languages are discussed in the following section.  
4 Comparative perspective 
In this section, we discuss two languages that appear to have been affected by the same 
functional transformation that affected the verbal system of Bunan. We trace the process in 
reverse temporal order, that is to say, we first discuss a language that provides clear evi-
dence for an epistemic use of person agreement morphology and then turn to a language 
that does not bear witness to the functional reanalysis, but still appears to give evidence of a 
very early stage of the process. 
4.1 Dolakha Newar 
Dolakha Newar belongs to the Newaric branch of Tibeto-Burman and is spoken in East Ne-
pal (Janakpur Zone) by about 5,000 speakers (Genetti 2007). Genetti describes Dolakha 
Newar as a language with an agreement system that is based on the categories “person” 
and “number”. Consider the following table, which gives the present tense forms of the verb 
hat- “to say”.  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
   
26 
 
Table 8: Dolakha Present Tense paradigm 
 Singular Plural 
1 hat-a-gi hat-a-gu 
2 hat-a-n hat-a-min 
2HON hat-a-gu hat-a-gu 
3 hat-a-i hat-a-hin 
  
As the paradigm illustrates, Dolakha verbs are inflected for both person and number. 
Apart from a syncretism between the first person plural form and the second person honorific 
forms, the different forms are formally distinct. 
However, the paradigm given Table 8 conceals a peculiar feature of Dolakha agree-
ment morphology: Agreement markers are not consistently used to index the person value of 
the subject on the predicate. In certain contexts, the grammar of Dolakha allows for the ex-
ploitation of person markers to encode epistemic distinctions. Genetti (2007: 172–174) has 
referred to this phenomenon as “disagreement in person”. An example that illustrates this is 
given in the following. 
(29) ji=ŋ  sir-eu.  ji  chana  nāpa  tuŋ   
1SG=EXT die-3SG.FUT 1SG 2SG.GEN together FOC  
sir-i 
die-1SG.FUT 
‘I will also die. I will die with you.’   
(Genetti 2007: 172) 
In the example given above, the verb sir- occurs twice with a first person subject. In 
the first case, the predicate takes the third person ending -eu, while in the second case it 
receives the first person ending -i. There is thus “disagreement” between the first person 
singular pronoun ji and the third person verb form sir-eu, which according to Genetti is em-
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ployed to encode differences in terms of volitionality. The use of a third person ending with a 
first person subject indicates that the relevant event is not subject to the speaker’s will. The 
use of a first person ending, in turn, indicates that the speaker exercises some degree of 
control over the event. In the example above, the event of dying is thus portrayed in two dif-
ferent ways. By means of the verb form sir-eu ‘die-3SG.FUT’, the protagonist portrays her own 
death as an inevitable fact that is beyond her control, while with the verb form sir-i ‘die-
1SG.FUT’, she portrays it as an intentional act. Accordingly, the epistemic use of first and third 
person markers in Dolakha Newar is functionally reminiscent of egophoric and allophoric 
endings in an egophoricity system as we find it in Bunan. “Egophoric” forms indicate that the 
speaker assumes a privileged epistemic perspective with regard to an event by virtue of be-
ing the participant who intentionally instigates the relevant event. “Allophoric” forms express 
that the speaker does not have that kind of privileged epistemic perspective. 
In spite of these obvious functional similarities, there are a number of differences, 
however. First, “egophoric” markers in Dolakha Newar have a wider range of application than 
their functional counterparts in Bunan. Dolakha “egophoric” markers may occur in combina-
tion with any kind of event type to indicate that the assertor is performing an action intention-
ally, e.g. as in (29), where the non-controllable verb sir- ‘to die’ takes “egophoric” marking. 
Such a use of egophoric markers is not possible in Bunan. Second, predicates that denote 
endoceptive events take default “allophoric” marking in Dolakha Newar if their subject is 
identical with the assertor. In Bunan, endoceptive events take default egophoric marking un-
der similar circumstances. Consider the following Dolakha example.  
(30) ji=ŋ  tharthar thut-a   
1SG=EXT EXPR shiver-3SG.PST 
‘I also shivered, going “tharthar”.’   
(Genetti 2007: 172) 
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Third, the epistemic use of person markers has not only been described for first per-
son subjects in Dolakha Newar. The same phenomenon is also attested in combination with 
second person subjects, as the following example sentences illustrate. 
(31) chi tul-eu 
2SG fall-3SG.FUT 
‘You will fall.’   
(Genetti 2007: 174) 
	
(32) chi tul-ina 
2SG fall-2SG.FUT 
‘You will fall intentionally (e.g. as we have planned).’   
(Genetti 2007: 174) 
The fact that the person morphology of Dolakha Newar can serve both a syntactic 
function and an epistemic function gives rise to the question of how these two functions are 
interrelated. According to Genetti (2007: 174), the syntactic function is clearly more funda-
mental in contemporary Dolakha Newar. 
While it is possible to manipulate the agreement system in this way, it is not at 
all common, and it has certainly not grammaticalized in the sense of becoming 
a regular or required feature of the grammar of the language. One can certain-
ly use first-person morphology with non-control verbs without any added impli-
cation of heightened volition […]. It is the use of the third-person morphology 
with first-person subjects which is marked, and which emphasizes the lack of 
volition. 
Accordingly, the Dolakha verbal system encodes person agreement for the main part, 
but may be exploited to encode differences in terms of volitionality. The Dolakha Newar ver-
bal system thus bears witness to the same functional reanalysis that also affected the Bunan 
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verbal system, as argued by Widmer (2015). However, it appears that Dolakha Newar bears 
witness to an earlier stage of that transformation. In Bunan, the old person agreement sys-
tem has been largely reanalyzed as an egophoricity system and is only accessible through 
internal reconstruction. In Dolakha Newar, however, the person agreement system and the 
egophoricity system coexist synchronically. The Dolakha agreement markers can be exploit-
ed to express epistemic categories, but still serve the primary function of indexing person 
values on the predicate. From the perspective of contemporary Bunan, Dolakha Newar thus 
represents “a window to the past” that may provide us with interesting insights into the func-
tional transformation of person markers into egophoricity markers. 
However, the examples that we have considered so far do not allow us to make any 
conclusions about the motivation of the change. Simple declarative clauses do not seem to 
constitute a grammatical environment that induces the reanalysis of person marking as epis-
temic marking, as there is no obvious reason for why such constructions should give rise to 
the innovative epistemic construal of person markers by themselves. This gives rise to the 
question as to whether there are other grammatical constructions in Dolakha Newar where 
person markers are used to encode epistemic differences. Indeed, there are such construc-
tions, viz. reported speech complement clauses. Consider the following example sentences. 
(33) rekā=n jin rājā=ta nāplat-ki haŋ-an hat-cu 
Reka=ERG 1SG.ERG king=DAT meet-1SG.PST say-PART say-3SG.PST 
‘Rekai said “Ii met the king”.’   
(Genetti 1994: 109) 
 
(34) rekā=n jin rājā=ta nāplat-cu haŋ-an hat-cu 
Reka=ERG 1SG.ERG king=DAT meet-3SG.PST say-PART say-3SG.PST 
‘Rekai said that Ij met the king.’   
(Genetti 1994: 109) 
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The reported speech complement given in (33) reproduces the words of the reported 
speaker. The complement clause does not display any features that would mark it as a re-
ported utterance and would still be grammatical if it occurred without an accompanying quote 
frame. Accordingly, the reported speech complement in question represents an instance of 
“direct speech”. The situation is different for the sentence given in (34). Here, the reported 
speech complement no longer faithfully reproduces the words of the reported speaker. Ra-
ther, the personal pronoun jin ‘1SG’ reflects the viewpoint of the primary speaker, whereas 
the verb form nāplat-cu ‘meet-3SG.PST’ reflects the perspective of the reported speaker. Ac-
cordingly, the reported speech complement does not represent an instance of canonical “di-
rect speech”, which renders all deictically sensitive expressions from the perspective of the 
reported speaker, nor can it be interpreted as canonical “indirect speech”, which renders all 
deictically sensitive expressions from the perspective of the primary speaker (cf. Evans 2012: 
68–72). Rather, the reported speech complement in (34) represents a hybrid of the two pro-
totypes. At this point, we do not want to analyze this type of deictically mixed reported 
speech construction in more detail, as we will go further into this matter in § 5. For the time 
being, we may conclude that the aforementioned type of reported speech construction bears 
witness to a seeming agreement mismatch in terms of the verbal category “person”. 
It is important to note that Dolakha Newar does not possess indirect reported speech 
constructions, in which a finite inflected predicate renders the perspective of the primary 
speaker (Genetti, personal communication). In other words, a finite inflected verb form in a 
reported speech clause is invariably bound to the perspective of the reported speaker.13  
The fact that instances of “disagreement in person” are attested in both simple de-
clarative clauses and hybrid reported speech constructions in Dolakha Newar strongly sug-
gests that there is a connection between the two phenomena. Note that this hypothesis is not 
new. The formal and functional parallels between the two constructions were already noted 
                                                
13 Genetti (2007: 415) describes a reported speech construction that she refers to as “indirect quota-
tion”. However, that construction is based on a nominalized verb form rather than a finite inflected 
predicate. 
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by DeLancey (1992: 58‒59) and Genetti (1994: 108‒110). However, the two authors did not 
provide a more detailed account of how such constructions might trigger the reanalysis of 
person agreement markers as epistemic markers. 
As the use of person morphology for expressing epistemic distinctions rather than 
syntactic agreement has not been reported for any other grammatical domain in Dolakha 
Newar, we may infer that the phenomenon must have originated either in simple declarative 
clauses or deictically mixed reported speech constructions.14 As argued above, it is unlikely 
that simple declarative clauses represent the locus of the epistemization of person agree-
ment, as there is no functional explanation as for why simple declarative clauses should trig-
ger such a functional reanalysis. This then suggests that deictically mixed reported construc-
tions are in some way related to the epistemization of person agreement. However, if report-
ed speech constructions with mixed deixis such as the one given in (34) indeed have some-
thing to do with the functional reanalysis, then it should be possible to find languages that 
only display a prestage of the epistemic construal of person markers in deictically mixed re-
ported speech complements, but have not yet extended epistemic marking to other grammat-
ical contexts. A language that bears out this prediction is described in the following section. 
4.2 Sunwar 
Sunwar is a language of the Kiranti subgroup that is spoken in East Nepal (Janakpur 
and Samargata Zone) by approximately 25,000 speakers (Borchers 2008). Sunwar varieties 
generally possess verb agreement systems, but differ in terms of the complexity of these 
systems. The Sunwar variety described by Borchers (2008) merely displays monoactantial 
subject agreement, while the varieties described by Genetti (1988) and DeLancey (1992) 
exhibit biactantial agreement systems. Borchers (2008: 158) attributes these differences to a 
recent process of language change that triggered the simplification of the agreement system. 
                                                
14 Of course, it is conceivable that the construction that originally triggered the epistemic use of person 
markers does no longer exist in contemporary Dolakha Newar. However, as we argue in the following 
subsections, reported speech constructions provide an environment that allows for the functional rea-
nalysis of person markers as egophoricity markers. 
   
32 
 
The following table gives an overview of the monoactantial subject agreement system de-
scribed by Borchers (2008: 199). A detailed description of the more conservative biactantial 
agreement system can be found in Genetti (1988). 
Table 9: Sunwar past tense paradigm (gyap- ʻto buyʼ) 
 Singular Dual Plural 
1 gyap-ta gyap-tāsku gyap-tāk(a) 
2 gyap-tī gyap-tisī gyap-tinī 
3 gyap-tu gyap-tās(e) gyap-tem(e) 
 
Borchers (2008) does not report the use of person agreement markers to express ep-
istemic distinctions. However, DeLancey (1992: 58) provides examples of reported speech 
constructions that are structurally similar to the deictically mixed reported construction that 
was described for Dolakha Newar in the previous section. Consider the following examples. 
(35) mere-m go-m kyarš ʹsaî-tu de ʹtuî-šo tsha 
3SG-ERG 1SG-ERG goat kill-PST.3SG>3SG COMP know-NMLZ exist 
‘S/he knows that I killed a goat.’   
(DeLancey 1992: 58) 
 
(36) mere-m mere-m kyarš ʹsaî-tu de ʹtuî-šo tsha 
3SG-ERG 3SG-ERG goat kill-PST.3SG>3SG COMP know-NMLZ exist 
‘S/hei knows that s/hej killed a goat.’   
(DeLancey 1992: 58) 
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(37) mere-m mere-m kyarš ʹsaî-ta de ʹtuî-šo tsha 
3SG-ERG 3SG-ERG goat kill-PST.1SG>3SG COMP know-NMLZ exist 
‘S/hei knows that s/hei killed a goat.’   
(DeLancey 1992: 58) 
In (35) through (37), the subject pronoun of the reported speech clause is calculated 
from the perspective of the primary speaker, while the predicate is calculated from the per-
spective of the reported speaker. The mingling of perspectives is evident in (35), where the 
first person pronoun go-m ‘1SG-ERG’ is combined with the third person subject form ʹsaî-tu 
‘kill-PST.3SG>3SG’, and (37), where the third person pronoun mere-m ‘3SG-ERG’ is combined 
with the first person subject form ʹsaî-ta ‘kill-PST.1SG>3SG’. 
DeLancey (1992: 58‒59) makes three comments about the use of agreement mor-
phology in Sunwar that are worth being repeated here. First, he notes that the predicate in 
the complement clause does not have to reflect the perspective of the reported speaker, but 
may also render the perspective of the primary speaker. Accordingly, the language does not 
only possess deictically mixed reported speech constructions, but also displays indirect 
speech constructions. Second, DeLancey explicitly states that the phenomenon is not attest-
ed in simple declarative clauses, but is restricted to reported speech constructions. Third, he 
reports that the use of agreement morphology to express differences in terms of controllabil-
ity or volitionality is not attested in Sunwar. Hence, Sunwar first and third person markers do 
most probably not serve an epistemic function, but rather appear to encode a syntactic op-
position of “same person” vs. “other person”, respectively, in the context of reported speech 
clauses. Still, the reduction of the three-fold agreement system to a binary opposition in re-
ported speech constructions is formally reminiscent of the epistemic opposition that is attest-
ed in Dolakha Newar.  
These conjectures suggest that reported speech constructions are likely to be the 
grammatical domain in which the functional reanalysis of person markers takes place. In the 
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following section, we will demonstrate that such constructions indeed represent a suitable 
grammatical context for the process to take place. 
5 Reported speech constructions and the epistemization of 
person markers  
In this section, we want to elaborate on how exactly deictically mixed reported speech con-
structions may facilitate an epistemization of person markers. For this purpose, we first dis-
cuss deictically mixed reported speech constructions in an areal perspective in § 5.1, before 
turning to the epistemization of person markers in § 5.2.  
5.1 Hybrid reported speech 
In § 2.3, we introduced Evans’ (2012) canonical typology of reported speech constructions, 
based on which we argued that reported speech constructions in natural languages do not 
necessarily have to comply with the two prototypes “direct speech” and “indirect speech”. 
Rather, reported speech constructions may be deictically mixed, that is to say, contain deicti-
cally sensitive expressions that are calculated from different perspectives. In this article, we 
have already come across deictically mixed reported speech constructions in § 3 and § 4. 
The three languages that have been discussed in the preceding sections all possess report-
ed speech constructions in which the predicate is calculated from the perspective of the re-
ported speaker (i.e. a “direct perspective”), whereas pronouns (and other deictically sensitive 
expressions such as adverbs, demonstratives, etc.) are calculated from the perspective of 
the primary speaker (i.e. an “indirect perspective”). While such constructions appear peculiar 
form a Eurocentric perspective, they are commonly encountered in the Tibeto-Burman lan-
guages of the Himalayas, especially among Tibetic languages, e.g. Standard Tibetan (Tour-
nadre & Dorje 2003: 215‒216), Shigatse Tibetan (Haller 2000: 224‒226), Themchen Tibetan 
(Haller 2004: 159), Purik Tibetan (Zemp 2014: 783‒786), and Dege Tibetan (Häsler 1999: 
236–238), inter alia. In addition, they can also be found in a number of Tibeto-Burman lan-
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guages that do not belong to the Tibetic subgroup, e.g. Bunan, Standard Kinnauri, Kaike, 
Kathmandu Newar, Dolakha Newar, Sunwar, Japhug, and Rtau.   
The following pairs of examples are taken from Haller & Haller (2007) and contrast direct 
reported speech constructions with corresponding deictically mixed reported speech con-
structions. 
(38) Direct speech (Shigatse Tibetan)  
kʰœ̀ ŋa̠ pʰœ̠pā jı ̠̃   sa̖  
3SG.ERG 1SG Tibetan COP.EGO say.PFV 
‘S/hei said, “Ii am Tibetan.”’15   
(Haller & Haller 2007: 225) 
 
(39) Deictically mixed speech (Shigatse Tibetan)   
kʰœ̀ kʰō pʰœ̠pā jı ̠̃   sa̖  
3SG.ERG 3SG Tibetan COP.EGO say.PFV 
‘S/hei said (that) s/hei is Tibetan.’   
(Haller & Haller 2007: 225) 
 
(40) Deictically mixed speech (Shigatse Tibetan)    
kʰœ̀ ŋa̠ pʰœ̠pā pie̖  sa̖  
3SG.ERG 1SG Tibetan COP.ALLO say.PFV 
‘S/he said (that) I am Tibetan.’   
(Haller & Haller 2007: 226) 
Tournadre & Dorje (2003: 216) have coined the term “hybrid reported speech” for this type of 
reported speech construction and we will adopt this term for the following discussion. The 
                                                
15 In natural speech, one of the two pronouns is commonly dropped if they refer to the same person 
(cf. Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 216).  
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following map shows the geographical distribution of languages with hybrid reported speech 
constructions in the Himalayas. Tibetic languages are marked with a circle (○), while non-
Tibetic languages are marked with a triangle (△). 
Figure 1: The geographical distribution of hybrid reported speech constructions 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
In most Tibeto-Burman languages, the presence of hybrid reported speech construc-
tions is an epiphenomenon of egophoricity marking. Remember that canonical egophoricity 
systems revolve around the notion of the assertor, viz. the speech act participant whose ac-
cess to the knowledge conveyed in a proposition is at stake. As argued in § 2.2, the assertor 
in reported speech clauses is the reported speaker. Accordingly, a language with a canonical 
egophoricity system is expected to display a reported speech construction with mixed deixis 
if the egophoricity opposition is encoded in the domain of reported speech.16  
Hybrid reported speech constructions, however, have not only been reported for Him-
alayan languages with egophoricity systems, but also for languages with person agreement 
systems. Two such languages, Dolakha Newar and Sunwar, have been discussed in § 4 
above. In addition, Jacques (2007) and Antonov & Jacques (2014) have described hybrid 
reported speech for the Rgyalrongic languages Japhug and Rtau, respectively, both of which 
display person agreement systems, and the diachronic scenario that we argue for in this arti-
cle entails that Bunan already displayed hybrid reported speech constructions when the lan-
guage still possessed a full-fledged person agreement system. 
The abovementioned non-Tibetic languages with hybrid reported speech construc-
tions are all spoken on the fringe of the Tibetan speaking area. This suggests that hybrid 
reported speech may have arisen in these languages through contact with Tibetan varieties. 
This assumption is corroborated by the fact that all of the relevant languages have been in 
                                                
16 This prediction is borne out by the fact that such constructions have been described for languages 
with egophoricity systems that are not spoken in the greater Himalayan region, e.g. the Barbacoan 
language Tsafiki (Dickinson 2002: 94) or the Nakh-Daghestanian language Akhvakh (Creissels 2008: 
9). 
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contact with Tibetan varieties in the past. The influence of Tibetan is most obvious in the 
case of Bunan, which displays a strong Tibetan influence both in its lexicon and in its gram-
mar (Widmer forthcoming). In the case of Rgyalrongic languages, the presence of Tibetan 
loanwords likewise suggests a longstanding contact with Tibetan speaking communities (cf. 
Jacques 2007: 83). In the case of Sunwar and Dolakha Newar, the influence of Tibetan may 
be less apparent. However, van Driem (2001: 725‒726) reports that northern Sunwar com-
munities have been in longstanding contact with Tibetan speaking communities. In the case 
of Dolakha Newar, there is evidence that the Dolakha community was engaged in trade with 
Tibet in the past. Genetti (2007: 21) and Slusser (1982: 60, fn. 56) describe Dolakha as an 
important village on the trade route to Tibet. Accordingly, there is good evidence that the 
presence of hybrid reported speech in languages such as Dolakha Newar, Sunwar, Japhug, 
and Rtau is the consequence of intense language contact with Tibetan speaking communi-
ties.  
If we describe hybrid reported speech as an areal feature, we have to be clear on 
what exactly we mean when we say that the reported speech strategy is borrowed from one 
language into another. In line with Evans’ (2012) approach, we maintain that the borrowing 
process should not be described at the level of the entire reported speech construction but at 
the level of individual deictically sensitive constituents. Accordingly, the recipient language 
does not borrow the entire construction but the convention of an invariably direct construal of 
the predicate in reported speech. In other words, the recipient language more and more ties 
the predicate of reported speech clauses to the perspective of the reported speaker. As a 
consequence, an indirect construal of the predicate becomes less and less conventional and 
is eventually no longer possible. In the following section, we address the diachronic implica-
tions of this development. 
5.2 The epistemization of person markers 
In the previous section, we have described the phenomenon of hybrid reported speech, a 
particular type of reported speech construction with mixed deixis that is commonly encoun-
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tered in Tibeto-Burman languages of the Himalayan area. We have put forward the hypothe-
sis that hybrid reported speech represents an areal phenomenon in the Himalayas and aris-
es if a language adopts the invariably direct construal of the predicate in reported speech 
clauses, while retaining the indirect construal of other deictically sensitive constructions such 
as personal pronouns. In the following, we discuss the diachronic consequences of this inno-
vation. We first describe the process from a purely functional perspective without reference 
to particular languages and then relate it to the different pieces of evidence that can be found 
in the grammar of Bunan, Dolakha Newar, and Sunwar.  
In languages that allow for both a direct and an indirect construal of the predicate in 
reported speech, the opposition of direct and indirect forms allows a speaker to frame a re-
ported utterance in two different ways. The speaker may either choose to report the event in 
direct speech and to adopt the viewpoint of the reported speaker (i.e. She said, “I eat meat.”), 
or she / he may choose to render the event in indirect speech and to report the relevant facts 
from her / his own perspective (i.e. Shei said (that) shei eats meat.). Accordingly, she / he 
may either take an “inside perspective” or an “outside perspective” with regard to the report-
ed event. The difference between direct and indirect reports thus appears to be a purely sty-
listic matter in such languages. However, the distinction may gradually acquire an epistemic 
dimension if the grammar of a language begins to generalize the “direct” construal of the 
predicate. As we have argued in the preceding section, this convention appears to spread 
easily from one language to another through language contact.  
Let us briefly illustrate this development on the basis of first and third person forms, 
which serve as the basis of the emerging epistemic system.17 In reported discourse, first per-
son forms are prototypically construed as “direct”, that is, as expressing the inside perspec-
tive of the reported speaker (e.g. She said, “I eat meat.”). To be sure, first person forms may 
also be interpreted “indirectly”, that is, as expressing an outside perspective on the primary 
                                                
17 We do not discuss second person endings at this point, as they gradually become functionally obso-
lete in the course of the epistemization. This process is discussed in § 6.3 in more detail. 
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speaker from the stance of the reported speaker (e.g. She said (that) I eat meat.). However, 
the second possibility is clearly less common and pragmatically marked, as speakers rarely 
report events in the form of quotations if they perform or performed them themselves. First 
person forms are thus commonly associated with a direct perspective, and the data that were 
discussed in the preceding section strongly suggest that their direct construal may eventually 
become generalized. Once a language adopts this convention, first person forms may no 
longer relate to the “outside perspective” of the primary speaker, but exclusively express the 
“inside perspective” of the reported speaker. In case of third person markers, things are dif-
ferent. Third person forms are equally likely to relate to the perspective of the reported 
speaker (e.g. Shei said, “(S)hej eats meat.”) or the perspective of the primary speaker (e.g. 
Shei said that shei / (s)hej eats meat.) and are thus not naturally associated with either a di-
rect or an indirect construal. However, as we have argued above, first person forms have a 
natural tendency to be associated with direct speech and may eventually be consistently 
construed as expressing a direct perspective, and it is easily conceivable that this invariably 
direct construal may then be analogically extended to third person forms.  
If a language gradually adopts the convention of allowing a consistently direct con-
strual of reported predicates, the opposition of a direct vs. an indirect construal of the predi-
cate comes to serve as the basis of an innovative grammatical category. The permanent 
direct construal of predicates in reported speech clauses entails that the formerly stylistic 
distinction of an inside perspective expressed by first person markers (i.e. event construed 
from the reported speaker’s viewpoint) and an outside perspective expressed by third person 
markers (i.e. event construed from the primary speaker’s viewpoint) is transferred into a dis-
tinction that specifies the relation between the subject of the matrix clause and the subject of 
the dependent clause as referring to either the same person or a different person. This binary 
distinction may then develop into an egophoricity opposition. 
Based on the small amount of data that is currently available, it is not possible to say 
whether the binary opposition that is described in the preceding paragraph will inevitably 
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evolve into an egophoricity opposition or whether it might remain a reduced syntactic system 
that indexes whether or not the subject of the matrix clause and the subject of the dependent 
clause are coreferent. In other words, the data do not allow us to determine whether the bi-
nary system will initially still be syntactically motivated, but may later be reanalyzed as being 
epistemically motivated or whether the syntactic construal and the epistemic construal of the 
binary opposition represent entirely distinct lines of development. Notwithstanding these un-
certainties, there is little doubt that the former opposition between first person endings and 
third person endings may develop into a “proto-epistemic” distinction that specifies the re-
ported speaker’s access to the reported event as either “privileged due to internal perspec-
tive” or “non-privileged due to external perspective”, respectively, once the direct construal of 
the predicate in reported speech clauses has become entirely generalized. In the course of 
the epistemization, person markers thus change their function and begin to revolve around a 
new grammatical concept, viz. the assertor. In other words, they cease to bear a syntactic 
relation to the person subject of a clause and begin to bear an epistemic relation to the as-
sertor of the proposition, which is the person who originally uttered these sentences, that is 
the reported speaker.18 The proto-epistemic distinction is initially still confined to reported 
speech constructions. Subsequently, the scope of markers expressing privileged access is 
reduced to a number of specific participant role (see § 6.1 for a discussion of this aspect), 
which in turn allows for the extension of epistemic marking to new contexts (see § 6.2 for a 
discussion of this aspect), that is to say, simple declarative and interrogative clauses. Evi-
dence from Dolakha Newar and Bunan suggests that epistemic marking first supersedes the 
old person agreement system in simple declarative contexts. In interrogative contexts, rem-
nants of the former person agreement system persist for some more time, but eventually 
                                                
18 The term “person subject” here exclusively refers to the grammatical relation that is defined by per-
son agreement. The epistemization of person agreement does thus not necessarily entail that the 
syntactic notion of subject cease to exist entirely, as the case of Bunan illustrates. In Bunan, there is 
still a robust “number subject”, which is defined by number agreement on the predicate (Widmer forth-
coming). However, the “person subject”, which is defined by person agreement on the predicate, has 
been largely replaced by the notion of the assertor. 
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epistemic marking becomes fully established in interrogative contexts as well and thus com-
pletely replaces the former person agreement system. 
The languages discussed in § 3 and § 4 bear witness to different stages of the pro-
cess described above. Sunwar appears to be a language in which we encounter an early 
stage of the functional transformation. The language possesses hybrid reported speech 
complement clauses, in which person markers allow for a distinction between “same person” 
(marked by first person endings) and “other person” (marked by third person endings) that 
appears to be syntactically rather than epistemically motivated. At the same time, Sunwar 
also exhibits indirect speech complement clauses, in which there is straightforward agree-
ment in terms of the category person between the subject and the predicate of the speech 
complement clause. Accordingly, the epistemic grounding of the predicate in the perspective 
of the reported speaker has not become generalized yet. As noted above, it is not possible to 
say whether the syntactic distinction of “same person” vs. “other person” bears witness to a 
prestage of an epistemic system or a different line of development. It is conceivable that the 
binary opposition remains syntactic as long as the invariably direct construal of reported 
predicates has not become fully conventionalized. However, for the time being, we can only 
speculate on the diachronic relation between the binary syntactic system that is attested in 
Sunwar and the binary epistemic systems that are attested in Dolakha Newar and Bunan.  
An intermediary stage of the process is documented in Dolakha Newar. The language 
does not possess indirect speech complement clauses with a finite predicate. Accordingly, 
hybrid reported speech represents the only non-direct speech strategy that is based on a 
finite verb form. This has allowed for the functional reanalysis of person markers as epistem-
ic markers in the context of hybrid reported speech complements, which is reflected by the 
fact that the innovative epistemic system is occasionally extended to declarative clauses. 
Furthermore, the proto-epistemic distinction of “privileged access due to internal perspective” 
and “non-privileged access due to external perspective” has developed into an opposition 
between events that are controlled by the assertor vs. events that are not controlled by the 
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assertor due to a reduction of the scope of egophoric markers (see § 6.1 for a more elabo-
rate discussion of this process). 
A late stage of the process is attested in Bunan, where the innovative epistemic sys-
tem has almost completely replaced the old person agreement system in declarative speech 
acts and is also firmly established in interrogative speech acts. The last remnants of the old 
agreement system are archaic first and second person agreement markers, which are occa-
sionally used by old speakers in particular grammatical contexts, but are not found in the 
genealects of younger speakers.  
In this section, we have only provided a brief and condensed characterization of the 
diachronic process. However, we have not yet discussed the details of the scenario. These 
issues are addressed in the following section. 
6 Discussion 
There are several crucial questions that have not been addressed in the preceding section. 
For example, we have not accounted for the narrowing of the egophoric domain that occurs 
in the course of the epistemization process. Also, we have not yet described how exactly the 
innovative epistemic system is extended to new grammatical contexts, nor have we elabo-
rated on the loss of the second person endings. These questions and other aspects related 
to the diachronic scenario are taken up in the following subsections. 
6.1 The narrowing of the egophoric domain 
Let us first consider the process in the course of which the scope of egophoric markers is 
narrowed down to a limited set of participant roles. In § 5.2, we argue that the person agree-
ment system first evolves into a proto-epistemic opposition of “privileged access due to inter-
nal perspective” vs. “non-privileged access due to external perspective” according to the fol-
lowing process.  
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Table 10: Proposed reanalysis of person markers 
person agreement system  proto-epistemic system 
first person ð privileged access 
second person ð - 
third person ð non-privileged access 
 
During this proto-epistemic stage, markers expressing privileged access (i.e. former first per-
son endings) and markers expressing non-privileged access (i.e. former third person end-
ings) still retain the distribution that they displayed when they encoded person agreement. 
We maintain that this proto-epistemic system is unlikely to be extended to simple declarative 
constructions, as epistemic markers would then display a distribution that would be nearly 
identical to the original distribution of agreement markers. The only reference point that 
would allow speakers to distinguish between the epistemic and the syntactic construal of 
verbal endings would be their unequal patterning in declarative and interrogative contexts. 
Evidence from Bunan and Dolakha Newar, however, suggests that the epistemic construal of 
agreement markers only becomes fully established in interrogative contexts at a late stage in 
the epistemization process. This in turn indicates that the distribution of epistemic markers in 
interrogative contexts does not allow speakers to distinguish the innovative epistemic con-
strual from the conservative agreement construal, at least not in initial stages of the trans-
formation, as personal questions to the addressee are still more likely to be formed with a 
second person ending rather than an epistemic marker at that stage. Thus, a crucial step that 
creates the basic prerequisites for the extension to take place is a change in the distribution 
of verbal endings. The effects of this process can be seen in Bunan and Dolakha Newar. In 
both languages, egophoric markers no longer retain the distribution that they exhibited during 
the proto-epistemic stage, that is to say, they no longer occur on just any predicate that takes 
the assertor as its “subject”. Rather, egophoric markers have become restricted to contexts 
in which the assertor assumes certain participant roles.  
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We then have to ask the question of what may have triggered the narrowing of the 
egophoric domain in the two languages. In order to answer this question, it is worthwhile to 
take a closer look at the distribution of epistemic markers during the proto-epistemic stage of 
the epistemization process, viz. the phase when agreement markers have been fully reana-
lyzed as epistemic markers in the context of reported speech, but still display their original 
distribution. At that stage, egophoric markers (i.e. former first person endings) are used 
whenever a reported speaker is identical with the “subject” of the relevant predicate, that is, 
whenever the speaker makes a statement about herself / himself. Allophoric markers (i.e. 
former third person endings), on the other hand, are used whenever a reported speaker is 
not identical with the “subject” of the relevant predicate, that is, whenever the speaker reports 
what another person does / did or what happens / happened to another person. In such a 
proto-epistemic system, the distribution of epistemic markers still bears witness to a subject 
relation, as that notion played a crucial role in the former agreement system. However, the 
subject relation is in fact no longer relevant in the epistemic system, as the proto-epistemic 
opposition no longer indexes the speech-act role of the subject, but rather encodes the re-
ported speaker’s epistemic perspective with regard to the relevant event. In contrast to the 
reported speaker’s identity, the reported speaker’s epistemic perspective is largely a matter 
of construal. Accordingly, the epistemization of person markers eventually allows for a shift in 
the distribution of verbal endings. Evidence from Bunan and Dolakha Newar suggests that 
this shift can be modelled with the participant roles that were already introduced in § 3.2, i.e. 
(i) agent, (ii) endoceptive experiencer, (iii) exoceptive experiencer, (iv) theme. In both Bunan 
and Dolakha Newar, exoceptive experiencers and theme arguments have fallen out of the 
scope of egophoric markers. In Dolakha Newar, endoceptive experiencers have become 
excluded from the domain of egophoric marking as well. This is illustrated in Figure 2 below.  
Figure 2: The narrowing of the egophoric domain in Bunan and Dolakha Newar 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
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The narrowing of the egophoric domain that occurred in Bunan and Dolakha Newar 
can be explained as a consequence of the fact that the four participant roles differ with re-
gard to the “epistemic exclusiveness” of the event they are associated with. Exoceptive expe-
riencers and theme arguments are involved in events that are generally characterized by a 
low degree of epistemic exclusiveness. That is because prototypically non-controllable 
events (e.g. falling, stumbling, losing, etc.) as well as exoceptive events (e.g. hearing, see-
ing, smelling, etc.) are caused by forces and conditions that are located outside of one’s 
body or mind. In terms of their epistemic accessibility, such events are thus conceptually 
contiguous to other types of events in which the assertor assumes the role of an uninvolved 
observer (e.g. when stating what another person did or what happened to another person) or 
an involved undergoer (e.g. when stating what another person did to oneself). Accordingly, it 
seems sensible that situations in which the assertor assumes the role of an exoceptive expe-
riencer or theme argument and situations in which a non-assertor assumes those roles may 
be conceptualized in the same way in an egophoricity system. 
Endoceptive experiencers likewise appear to possess a comparatively low degree of 
epistemic exclusiveness. This is suggested by the fact that endoceptive experiencers have 
become excluded from the scope of egophoric markers in Dolakha Newar and do not fall into 
the scope of egophoric markers in various other languages, e.g. Kathmandu Newar (Har-
greaves 2005), Kaike (Watters 2006), or Akhvakh (Creissels 2008). Still, endoceptive experi-
encers may be included in the scope of egophoric markers, as the case of Bunan demon-
strates, where predicates denoting internal sensations receive default egophoric marking if 
their subject is identical with the assertor. The inconsistent patterning of endoceptive events 
is understandable from a cognitive perspective. Endoceptive events are more exclusive than 
exoceptive events in terms of their epistemic accessibility, since they involve an internal 
stimulus that is only accessible to the person who experiences the relevant sensation and to 
which no other person can relate directly. At the same time, endoceptive events are less ex-
clusive than controllable events, as the associated mental states are often related to an entity 
in the outside world. The sensation of fear, for example, prototypically presupposes the pres-
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ence of an entity in the surrounding world that causes one’s fear. The entity in question may 
also evoke a similar sensation in other persons, which then means that one’s mental state 
cannot be considered to be exclusive, as other persons can indirectly relate to it as well. Due 
to their intermediate status, endoceptive events may either retain a default egophoric con-
strual if they take the assertor as their “subject”, or they may receive a default allophoric con-
strual.  
The only participant role that consistently falls into the scope of egophoric markers is 
the agent. This is suggested by evidence from Bunan and Dolakha Newar, where egophoric 
have scope over agent arguments, and by cross-linguistic evidence in general. We know of 
several languages in which agent arguments are the only participant roles that fall into the 
scope of egophoric markers, e.g. Tsafiki (Dickinson 2000), Kathmandu Newar (Hargreaves 
2005), Kaike (Watters 2006), Akhvakh (Creissels 2008), but we are not aware of a single 
language in which agent arguments are consistently excluded from the egophoric domain. It 
is not difficult to come up with a cognitive explanation for the strong association of intentional 
acting and egophoric marking. Knowledge that is associated with one’s own intentional ac-
tions is particularly personal and exclusive, as one’s intentions are only directly accessible to 
oneself but ultimately hidden to any other person. In addition, one’s intentions are usually not 
caused or influenced by entities in the surrounding world, but rather have their ultimate origin 
inside of one’s mind. Accordingly, it is sensible that events that emanate from the assertor’s 
intentions constitute the core of the egophoric domain.  
Based on these results, we postulate the following hierarchy of participant roles, 
which allows us to model the change in the distribution of epistemic markers. The higher a 
participant role is ranked, the higher is the likelihood that the relevant participant role will fall 
into the scope of an egophoric marker, provided that the relevant marker can take scope 
over participant roles. 
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Figure 3: The cognitive accessibility of different participant roles 
(i) agent  
(ii) endoceptive experiencer 
(iii) exoceptive experiencer  
(iv) theme 
Based on these considerations, the narrowing of the egophoric domain that is attest-
ed in both Bunan and Dolakha Newar may be interpreted as a natural process that is caused 
by differences in the epistemic accessibility of knowledge that is associated with different 
participant roles. Certain events are associated with a more exclusive type of knowledge 
than others, which eventually may cause a reorganization of the proto-epistemic system in 
reported speech constructions.  
Another factor that may influence the development of the proto-epistemic system and 
that has not been addressed so far is language contact with Tibetan varieties. It is well-
known that the parameter of controllability plays a crucial role in the egophoricity oppositions 
of many Tibetan varieties (cf. Haller 2000; Hein 2001; Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 141–142; 
inter alia). Accordingly, the strong association of egophoric marking with controllability might 
in some cases be explicable as a result of intense contact with Tibetan speaking communi-
ties. However, based on current knowledge, it is difficult to assess to which extent the nar-
rowing of the egophoric domain is a consequence of contact with Tibetan varieties. Only fur-
ther research on the epistemization of person markers will allow us to clarify this question. 
Eventually, the synchronic distribution of epistemic markers in Bunan and Dolakha 
Newar suggests that the proto-epistemic distinction of “privileged access due to internal per-
spective” vs. “non-privileged access due to external perspective” only represents a transitory 
stage and is transferred into an epistemic distinction in which egophoric marking is only pos-
sible if the assertor assumes a specific participant role. As argued above, this entails that 
some participant roles become excluded from the domain of egophoric marking (i.e. former 
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first person marking) and assigned to the domain of allophoric marking (i.e. former third per-
son marking). In other words, it becomes possible to use allophoric markers (i.e. former third 
person markers) in contexts in which the subject of a predicate is the assertor. This intrusion 
of former third person forms into the former domain of first person agreement in reported 
speech constructions gives rise to a clear formal contrast between the innovative epistemic 
construal and the conservative syntactic construal of verbal endings, which eventually cre-
ates the prerequisites for a functional extension from reported speech constructions to simple 
declarative and interrogative contexts. This aspect is addressed in the following section in 
more detail. 
6.2 The extension of epistemic marking 
In the preceding section, we have argued that a narrowing of the egophoric domain lays the 
foundation for an extension of epistemic marking to new grammatical domains. Now, we 
need to address the question of how exactly this extension takes place. In § 5.2, we put for-
ward the hypothesis that the innovative epistemic system begins to spread to declarative and 
interrogative contexts simultaneously, but that the extension is first completed in declarative 
contexts and only later in interrogative contexts. These issues are discussed in more detail in 
the following paragraphs. 
The spread of the innovative epistemic construal of verbal endings from reported de-
clarative to simple declarative contexts is doubtlessly facilitated by the fact that the verbal 
endings that express privileged access to knowledge in reported speech clauses are formally 
identical with the verbal endings that express first person agreement in simple declarative 
clauses. The first person marker in simple declarative contexts may thus subsequently ac-
quire an epistemic construal by analogy with the phonologically identical egophoric markers 
in reported speech constructions and begins to index the speaker’s epistemic access to the 
relevant event rather than her / his speech act role. The analogical epistemization of the first 
person marker involves that allophoric markers (i.e. former third person markers) are used in 
contexts in which the speaker assumes the role of an exoceptive experiencer or theme ar-
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gument. Moreover, the use of allophoric markers is gradually conventionalized in declarative 
statements about second persons, while the use of second person markers becomes less 
and less common in such contexts (see § 6.3 below for a discussion of the loss of second 
person markers). Declarative statements about third persons are not formally affected by the 
epistemization of person agreement markers, as they take the same default markers before 
and after the epistemic shift.  
The spread of epistemic marking to interrogative contexts seems to be more difficult. 
To be sure, it appears natural that the innovative epistemic system should be analogically 
extended to questions once it has been firmly established in the domain of reported speech. 
However, we have to bear in mind that interrogative clauses with a second person subject 
take second person markers. These endings are not part of the emerging epistemic system, 
which entails that interrogative constructions with a second person subject do not provide a 
suitable context for the extension of epistemic marking. Accordingly, the spread of epistemic 
marking into the interrogative domain most probably begins with the epistemic construal of 
allophoric endings (i.e. former third person markers) in questions about third persons. In the 
context of a question, these endings are likely to be related to the viewpoint of the addressee 
rather than the perspective of the speaker, as the speaker does not provide personal 
knowledge in such a context, but rather draws on the knowledge of the addressee. This may 
then facilitate the construal of the addressee as a manifestation of the assertor, which in turn 
allows for the use of egophoric endings (i.e. former first person markers) in personal ques-
tions to the addressee and the use of allophoric endings (i.e. former third person markers) in 
questions about oneself.  
6.3 The loss of second person markers 
Another question that needs to be discussed concerns the loss of second person markers. 
The egophoricity oppositions that are attested in Bunan and Dolakha Newar are essentially 
binary, while person agreement systems are prototypically threefold. Accordingly, the trans-
formation of person agreement markers into epistemic markers necessarily entails that one 
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person value becomes obsolete. We thus have to answer the question of why it is the se-
cond person marker rather than the first or third person marker that is lost in the course of 
that process.  
In § 5.2, we argued that person markers are reanalyzed as epistemic markers once 
the direct construal of the predicate in reported speech has become generalized. We may 
thus assume that the direct construal of the predicate is also generalized in the case of se-
cond person endings, which are then consistently related to the epistemic perspective of the 
reported speaker. In other words, a second person marker in reported discourse is then con-
sistently construed as referring to the reported addressee (She said, ʻYou eat meat.ʼ) and not 
to the primary addressee (She said that you eat meat.). We presume that second person 
endings are likely to become less frequent once the reported speaker’s perspective has been 
generalized in reported speech constructions, since speakers rarely make statements about 
their about their collocutors except for pragmatically marked speech acts such as threats, 
commands, and warnings. Accordingly, they are gradually replaced by allophoric endings 
(i.e. former third person endings), which have a much higher frequency and represent one of 
the two functional cornerstones of the emerging epistemic system. For similar reasons, se-
cond person endings are replaced by allophoric endings in simple declarative contexts once 
the epistemic construal of person endings is extended to new grammatical contexts. In the 
case of interrogative contexts, second person endings appear to persist longer, which is 
most probably due to the fact that the spread of epistemic marking to such contexts is more 
intricate than the spread to simple declarative contexts (see § 6.2). However, eventually they 
are superseded by epistemic markers in interrogative clauses as well. 
Admittedly, an emerging egophoricity system may incorporate the second person 
endings, as the case of the Dolakha Newar examples (31) and (32) illustrates. However, our 
scenario suggests that this epistemic use of second person endings does not arise in report-
ed speech, but rather emerges in simple declarative clauses in consequence of a general-
ized conventional implicature (Atlas & Levinson 1981: 33). When the epistemic construal of 
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former third person endings is gradually conventionalized in simple declarative clauses, the-
se endings begin to contrast with second person endings. As the former third person endings 
are associated with an “outside perspective”, second person endings may become associat-
ed with the opposite value, i.e. an “inside perspective”. However, it appears that such a ter-
nary epistemic system only represents an instable transitory stage in the epistemization of 
person agreement markers. In any case, this is suggested by evidence from Bunan, where 
second person endings are on the verge of becoming entirely obsolete. 
6.4 Other possible starting point for the process 
Finally, one may ask the question of whether person markers are the only type of verbal end-
ings that are likely to undergo an epistemic reanalysis in complement clauses or whether 
there are other classes of morphemes that could potentially undergo a similar functional 
transformation in complementation constructions. There is evidence that certain non-finite 
verb forms may serve as a basis for emerging egophoricity oppositions. The Tibeto-Burman 
language Kathmandu Newar, which is closely related to the language Dolakha Newar dis-
cussed in § 4.1, exhibits an egophoricity system that has developed from non-finite verb 
forms. Although the relevant diachronic process has not been described in detail, there is 
evidence that the reanalysis of non-finite endings as epistemic markers occurred in comple-
ment constructions, where these suffixes were exploited to indicate whether or not the sub-
ject of the matrix clause was coreferent with the subject of the complement clause (cf. Ge-
netti 1994: 135‒136). This suggests that other types of paradigmatically arranged verbal 
endings may be recruited for an epistemic distinction if these endings mark whether or not 
the subject of the matrix clause is coreferent with the subject of the complement clause. The 
only prerequisite appears to be that the endings in question are consistently tied to one sin-
gle epistemic perspective. 
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7 Conclusion 
In this article, we have described a diachronic process in the course of which person agree-
ment markers are functionally reanalyzed as epistemic markers in the context of reported 
speech constructions. We adduced evidence from three Tibeto-Burman languages that bear 
witness to different stages of the process and reconstructed the individual steps of the pro-
cess by combining the methods of functional internal reconstruction and functional compara-
tive reconstruction (Givón 2000, Croft 2003: 272‒279). The data suggest that the prerequi-
site for the functional transformation is an innovation in the domain of reported speech, viz. 
the invariably direct construal of the predicate in reported speech complements in combina-
tion with an indirect construal of other deictically sensitive expressions, which gives rise to 
deictically mixed reported speech constructions. The areal distribution of deictically mixed 
reported speech in the greater Himalayan region suggests that such constructions may have 
originated in the Tibetan dialect continuum, where they arose as a consequence of ego-
phoricity marking and subsequently spread to non-Tibetic languages through contact. In lan-
guages with person agreement systems, the consistently “direct” construal of the predicate 
gradually gives rise to an epistemization of person agreement in the course of which first and 
third person markers are reanalyzed as expressing privileged vs. non-privileged access, re-
spectively, to the information conveyed in a proposition. The innovative epistemic markers 
may then be extended to simple declarative clauses and finally interrogative clauses. In the 
course of this process, the syntactic relation of the person subject is replaced with the epis-
temic relation of the assertor. 
While we have only adduced evidence from three Tibeto-Burman languages, there is 
reason to believe that similar processes may be at work in other Tibeto-Burman subgroups. 
Ping (2014) and Daudey (2014) have described Pumi varieties that display egophoricity sys-
tems, although other Pumi varieties display verb agreement systems (see Daudey 2014: 84 
for an overview). The egophoricity varieties may thus have arisen in the course of the same 
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process that is documented in Bunan and Dolakha Newar. However, this hypothesis can only 
be verified by comparative studies of Pumi varieties. 
Eventually, the question arises whether the diachronic process described in this arti-
cle may have given rise to epistemic systems in other parts of the world, viz. in the Caucasus 
(Creissels 2008), South America (Dickinson 2002; Bergqvist 2012), or Papua-New Guinea 
(San Roque & Loughnane 2012). Only further investigations into the diachrony of egophorici-
ty systems will allow us to clarify this question. 
8 Abbreviations 
1: first person, 2: second person, 3: person, ALLO: allophoric, COMP: complementizer, COND: 
conditional, COP: copula, DAT: dative, EGO: egophoric, ERG: ergative, EXPR: expressive vo-
cabulary, EXT: extension particle, FOC: focus, FUT: future, GEN: genitive, HON: honorific, INTR: 
intransitive, IPFV: imperfective, NMLZ: nominalizer, PART: participle, PFV: perfective, PL: plural, 
PRS: present tense, PST: past, Q: question, SG: singular, SUG: suggestive, TR: transitive. 
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